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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH S. GASSER, JR., et ux, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
DAVID M. HORNE, et ux, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
v. 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
et al, 
Third-Party Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 14513 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants (hereinafter referred to as 
"Appellants" or "Gassers") brought an action in the Third 
Judicial District Court to enjoin the delivery and recordation 
of a deed placed in escrow and to declare unenforceable an 
agreement they had entered into with Defendants-Respondents 
(hereinafter referred to as "Respondents" or "Homes"). 
Respondents counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint 
against American Savings & Loan Association and others, 
claiming an interest in certain real property resulting from 
the agreement between Appellants and Respondents. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
The Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin of the Third Judicial 
Court of Salt Lake County rendered judgment for Respondents 
and against Appellants refusing to set aside the agreement 
between the parties and adjudging Respondents to be the owners 
of an undivided 50% fee interest in certain real estate, 
subject, however, to a trust deed given to American Savings & 
Loan to secure a certain promissory note, on which note and 
obligation the court further determined Respondents were 
personally liable. 
Appellants filed their notice of appeal on January 5, 
1976, which appeal was dismissed by this Court on February 2, 
1976. Although no further notice of appeal was thereafter 
filed, on motion of Appellants the lower court on March 1, 
1976, granted Appellants an extension of time to file their 
notice of appeal. How Appellants are able to revive an appeal 
which has once been dismissed by this Court is a matter which 
this Court will have to reconcile. But since Respondents do 
not believe the appeal itself has substance, they have chosen 
to address their brief to the merits. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
In the event this Court chooses to review the case on 
the merits, Respondents seek affirmance of the decision and 
judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents take issue with Appellants' Statement of 
Facts as being incomplete. Appellants state only those facts 
favorable to their contentions to the exclusion of evidence 
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supporting the findings of the trial court. They further fail 
to support many of their statements with any specific reference 
to the record• Respondents, therefore, feel obliged to submit 
the Statement of Facts as follows: 
During 1971 and 1972 Appellant Joseph S. Gasser, Jr. 
became involved in several business transactions with a group 
of businessmen and doctors, headed by Messrs. Skankey, Doty, 
Strausser and Sorbonne. Appellants Gasser acquired a 42.5% 
interest in the Hill Gate Terrace Mobile Home Community, 
Layton, Utah. Dr. Skankey also acquired a 42.5% interest in 
the same trailer park. (Tr. 35-38, 97-101) As a result of 
this acquisition by Appellants and other transactions between 
these parties, Gassers became indebted to Skankey individually 
in the sum of approximately $139,000.00, evidenced by a 
promissory note. (Tr. 100-105) This note was secured by a 
second mortgage on Gassers1 interest in the Hill Gate Trailer 
Park. (Tr. 105) Messrs. Skankey, Doty, Strausser and 
Sorbonne (referred to by the trial court as "the group") also 
held a note from Gasser for $225,000.00. This note was 
secured by a mortgage of Gassersf interest in the trailer park 
and also by a mortgage on certain Montana properties. (Tr. 
101-104; Exh. 12-D) In August of 1972, Gasser proposed 
refinancing the trailer park in order to pay these notes and 
offered to purchase Dr. Skankey1s 42.5% interest for 
$200,000.00. (Tr. 107, 110, 114; Exhs. 13-D and 15-D) Dr. 
Skankey agreed to sell his interest for $275,000.00. (Tr. 
3 
42; Exh. 18-D) 
When Gassers1 obligations became delinquent in November, 
1972, Mr. Joseph L. Henriod was retained by Skankey and "the 
group" to collect the same; and Gasser was given notice to 
pay. (Tr. 38-40, 350) Continuing pressure was thereafter 
exerted on Gasser by Mr. Henriod to pay the amounts owing. 
(Tr. 113, 330) Gasser came to Mr. Henriod on several occasions 
and discussed with him different methods or alternatives by 
which Gasser might meet his obligations to Dr. Skankey and 
"the group." (Tr. 40-42, 113-114, 288, 299; Exh. 15-D) At 
this time Appellants were represented by Attorney James Barker 
who continued to act as legal counsel for them through July, 
1973. (Tr. 103, 118, 144-145, 288, 293-295) 
In the early part of January, 1973, Gasser approached 
Home and asked Home to help him obtain the necessary 
financing to pay off the obligations and purchase the remain-
ing 57.5% interest in the trailer park. (Tr. 56, 114) After 
viewing the property, Home agreed to lend assistance but 
stated that if he were required to sign for a loan he would 
need to receive compensation therefor. (Tr. 57-61, 357) 
Home and Gasser then submitted a joint loan application to 
American Savings & Loan Association for over $1,050,000.00, 
which money was to be used to pay off the obligations owing 
by Gasser individually and to acquire the other 57.5% interest 
in the trailer park which was owned by Skankey and two others. 
(Tr. 111-112; Exh. 3-P) 
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Late in March, 1973, Gasser called Mr. Henriod and 
reported that he (Gasser) was going to receive the necessary 
outside financial assistance from Home and that they were 
going to get a loan from American Savings. (Tr. 290) Prior 
to that time Mr. Henriod was not involved in and had no 
knowledge of Gasserrs contacts with Home. (Tr. 113, 290-291) 
Although Mr. Henriod had represented Home on other matters, 
he did not undertake to represent Home at any time in this 
transaction. (Tr. 115, 290, 319, 326, 344, 350) As the 
representative for Dr. Skankey and "the group," Mr. Henriod 
discussed with Gasser and Home their financing agreements; 
but only at Gasser1s requests. (Tr. 113, 115, 309, 326, 335, 
344) He was never asked to represent Home (Tr. 290, 368) 
and was never paid by Home. (Tr. 312, 36 8) 
Gasser brought Home into Mr. Henriod1 s office on March 
29, 1973, to discuss the refinancing with American Savings 
in particular. (Tr. 290-293) After coming to an agreement 
with Home in private conversation and out of the presence 
of Henriod, Gasser then dictated to Mr. Henriod what he and 
Home had tentatively agreed verbally to do; that is, if Home 
would sign on the loan from American Savings, he (Gasser) 
would give Home a 50% interest in the trailer park, subject 
to the new loan of over a million dollars; provided that if 
Gasser were able to refinance the loan within 60 days without 
Home's signature, Home would not receive any compensation. 
(Tr. 115, 117, 292, 314) This agreement, Exhibit 4-P, was 
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typed and sent unsigned to Mr. Barker for his approval as 
attorney for the Gassers. (Tr. 118, 292) Home did not 
discuss the matter further with either Gasser or Mr. Henriod 
until late June, 1973. (Tr. 116, 139, 296-297, 322) 
Mr. Henriod continued to press Gasser to pay Skankey and 
"the group" the overdue obligations. (Tr. 120, 330) Because 
Gasser still procrastinated, proceedings were begun in Montana 
to foreclose the Montana mortgage to "the group." (Tr. 289) 
On June 11, written notice was given by Henriod to Gasser 
that unless the debts were satisfied by June 25, 1973, 
proceedings would be instituted to foreclose the Hill Gate 
mortgage. (Tr. 121, 297? Exh. 16-D) 
For more than 60 days following the meeting in Henriod's 
office and particularly during April, May and early June, 
Gasser made further efforts to obtain financing without Home's 
signature. (Tr. 116, 118, 248) He finally informed Mr. 
Henriod that he (Gasser) would be ready to close on June 25 
and was obtaining the necessary financing without Home. (Tr. 
134-136, 296-298, 300) On June 22, the final closing agreement 
(Exh. 18-D) between Gasser and Skankey and "the group" was 
prepared; and in accordance with Gasserfs instructions to Mr. 
Henriod, Henriod deleted Home's name from the transaction. 
(Tr. 134-136, 298-299; Exh. 18-D, 1[4) Then, on June 25, 
without prior warning or notice, Gasser called Mr. Henriod 
inquiring whether Home was ready to sign their agreement, 
Exhibit 4-P. (Tr. 136, 300) Since Mr. Henriod had not 
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discussed the agreement with Horne subsequent to the March 29 
meeting, he replied that he didn't know but would inquire. 
(Tr. 301) When reached in San Francisco, Horne simply stated 
that he didn't know but would discuss it upon his return. 
(Tr. 301, 359) 
On June 27, 1973, Horne and Gasser again met in Mr. 
Henriod1s office. Horne declined to sign the agreement, 
claiming that the time provided in Exhibit 4-P had already 
expired. (Tr. 301, 360) At that point Gasser became upset 
and left. (Tr. 84, 300) The next morning, June 28, Gasser 
called Mr. Henriod and told him that he and Horne had talked 
and resolved their differences. (Tr. 140-141, 302, 329, 364) 
He asked Mr. Henriod to prepare a new agreement (Exhs. 5-P 
and 22-D) and dictated the following terms: that upon the 
extension of his credit, Horne would receive a 50% interest 
in the trailer park if Gasser could not sell the loan to 
Equitable Savings of Portland within 30 days. (Tr. 140-141, 
302, 364-365; Exhs. 5-P and 22-D) Gasser assured Horne there 
would be no trouble in selling the loan to Equitable Savings 
within 30 days. (Tr. 364) 
Agreement 5-P was immediately prepared and taken to 
Home's office by Mr. Henriod where he again met with both 
the Gassers and Homes. (Tr. 302-303, 354-355) After 
interlineating a change, this agreement was signed by the 
Homes and by Mr. Gasser. (Tr. 303-305) The Homes also 
executed a note and trust deed to American Savings for 
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$1,050,000.00. (Tr. 354) However, Appellant Freda Gasser 
refused to sign the agreement, stating that she wanted to 
first consult with their attorney, Mr. Barker. (Tr. 183, 305) 
The Gassers took both copies of the agreement (Exhs. 5-P and 
22-D) and that afternoon consulted with Mr. Barker. (Tr. 
144, 183-184, 305) 
Mr. Barker called Mr. Henriod the next morning, June 29, 
and indicated that he wanted a change in paragraph 4 of the 
agreement. (Tr. 145, 184, 307) He instructed Mr. Henriod to 
prepare the agreement with that change but stated he had 
advised Gassers not to execute the agreement. (Tr. 225-226, 
307, 344) The final agreement, Exhibit 6-P, was then prepared 
and the Homes' signatures were then obtained by messenger. 
(Tr. 308, 330, 338-339) 
That afternoon, June 29, Mr. Henriod delivered to the 
escrow agent's office the final agreement (Exh. 6-P), the 
note and the trust deed, all of which had been executed by 
the Homes. (Tr. 308) Agreement 6-P was then executed by 
both Mr. and Mrs. Gasser in the presence of Mr. Henriod and 
the escrow agent, Mr. Ralph J. Marsh. (Tr. 211-212, 308) 
Because of the lateness of the hour, a disbursal of funds was 
delayed until Monday, July 2. On Monday, disbursement of the 
proceeds of the loan was made by the escrow agent Marsh 
pursuant to instructions from the parties, including American 
Savings & Loan. (Tr. 204-205, 213-215, 249; Exh. 7-P) Mr. 
Henriod received the appropriate funds on behalf of his client, 
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Dr. Skankey. (Tr. 156, 309, 310) After other necessary 
disbursements, $94,000.00 was disbursed to Gasser for his 
personal use. (Tr. 149, 151; Exh. 19-D) The obligation owed 
"the group" was not paid at that time but was discharged at 
a later date with proceeds from the sale of the Montana 
properties. (Tr. 154-156, 208; Exh. 18-D) 
On July 3, 1973, Equitable Savings gave notice to 
American Savings and Appellants that it elected not to 
participate in the loan transaction. (Exh. 10-P) During the 
remainder of July, Appellants did nothing to arrange any other 
participation or sale of the loan nor did they attempt to 
contact either Respondents or Mr. Henriod to so inform them 
or to ask for any extension of time. (Tr. 148, 151, 311, 367) 
At the end of the 30-day period Appellants brought this suit 
to prevent recordation of the trust deed and note which 
Respondents had cosigned with Gassers and also to prevent the 
recordation or delivery of the deed from Gassers to Homes of 
a 50% interest in the property. (R. 1-2) As a result, the 
note and trust deed executed by Respondents and the deed to 
Respondents from Appellants were retained by the escrow agent, 
subject to final adjudication of the litigation. (Tr. 214, 
355-356) In January, 1974, while the litigation has been 
pending, American Savings & Loan has assigned a 75% interest 
in the note and trust deed executed by Appellants to Far West 
Federal Savings, Portland, Oregon, but has continued to 
service the loan. (Tr. 6, 250-252; Exh. 1-P) 
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POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT AND FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
It is apparent that the object of Appellants' brief is 
to reargue the weight of the evidence in an effort to get 
this Court to grant a retrial of the issues. Appellants ask 
this Court to review the evidence, resolve the issues in their 
favor where there is a conflict in the evidence and draw 
inferences from the facts different from those drawn by the 
trial court. In so doing, Appellants completely ignore the 
basic rule of law that findings of fact of the court below 
will not be disturbed on appeal because an appellant views 
the facts differently. Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452 (Utah, 
1975); Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 U.2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972); 
Nelson v. Nelson, 30 U.2d 80, 513 P.2d 1011 (1973); Corbet v. 
Corbet, 24 U.2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970). On appeal this 
Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
findings of the trial court. Cook v. Gardner, 14 U.2d 193, 
381 P.2d 78 (1963). 
The trial court is in an advantaged position in factual 
matters. Pagano v. Walker, supra; Peterson v. Holloway, 8 
U.2d 328, 334 P.2d 559 (1959); Child v. Child, 8 U.2d 261, 
332 P.2d 981 (1958); Cannon v. Neuberger, 1 U.2d 396, 268 
P. 2d 425 (1954). It is that court's responsibility and 
advantage to hear the testimony of the witnesses, observe 
their demeanor and conduct in testifying and give to such 
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testimony the weight to which the trier of the fact deems it 
is entitled. 
Likewise, in equity cases this Court, when reviewing the 
evidence to determine if it supports the findings, takes into 
account the advantaged position of the trial judge. Stone v. 
Stone, 19 U.2d 378, 431 P.2d 802 (1967). So long as there is 
evidence to support a factual determination, this Court will 
not reverse that determination even though this Court may 
disagree as to the determination. Brigham v. Moon Lake 
Electric Assn., 24 U.2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 (1970). 
The principles of equity state that findings "will not 
be disturbed unless the evidence clearly preponderates against 
them and a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought.11 
McCullough v. Wasserback, 30 U.2d 398, 518 P.2d 691 (1974). 
Factual issues which Appellants ask this Court to resolve anew 
were already resolved against Appellants by the trial court. 
A party failing to prevail in the lower court may not recite 
evidence favorable to its contentions to the exclusion of 
evidence supporting the lower court's findings. Thomson v. 
Condas, 27 U.2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 (1972). The question on 
appeal is not what the trial court could have found but, 
rather, were the findings supported by the evidence. 
Appellantsf statement of the law in the Conclusion of their 
brief that this Court may substitute its own findings where 
the evidence would support different findings is erroneous. 
Rule 7(a) and Rule 76, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, cited 
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by Appellants are not authority for such assertion. The 
evidence is clearly sufficient to support the trial court's 
findings. Indeed, Respondents urge that the evidence should 
satisfy this Court as it did the trial court. Therefore, the 
judgment should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES IS SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT AND 
VALID CONSIDERATION. 
Three different agreements were drafted at the request 
of Gassers. Exhibits 4-P, 5-P (22-D) and 6-P. Only Exhibit 
6-P was finally executed on June 29, 1973, by both Appellants 
and Respondents. This final agreement provided that in 
consideration for extending their credit by cosigning the note 
and trust deed to American Savings, Respondents would receive 
from Appellants a 50% interest in the trailer park; except 
that in the event the note was resold within 30 days to 
Equitable Savings, Respondents would receive nothing. The 
note and trust deed (Exh. 7-P) were executed by the Homes on 
June 28 and irrevocably placed in the hands of the escrow 
holder on June 29. The note and trust deed were not sold 
within the 30-day period. The only reason that the note and 
trust deed bearing signatures of the Homes were not recorded 
on July 30 is because this suit was brought by Appellants and 
an injunction was issued preventing such recordation. 
Appellants do not cite any cases holding that Respondents' 
extension of credit and assumption of liability do not 
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constitute sufficient consideration to support the agreement. 
Those cases cited by Appellants merely state the general rule— 
that consideration requires either a detriment to the promisee 
or a benefit to the promisor at his request. In Manwill v. 
Oyler, 11 U.2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961), this Court expounded 
this general rule that " . . . the principal must be bound to 
give some legal consideration to the other by conferring a 
benefit upon him or suffering a legal detriment at his 
request. . . ." There is little question but that both exist 
in this case; On June 29, Respondents agreed to become and 
actually became personally liable for $1,050,000.00—a detri-
ment to the promisees; Appellants received a loan which they 
could not have done without Homes signing with them on one 
set of the loan documents. They (Gassers) increased their 
ownership in the trailer park from 42.5% to 50% and received 
$94,000.00 in cash for their own personal use—benefits to 
the promisors as per their request. 
Several courts have found sufficient consideration to 
enforce a contract in similar situations. Western Savings & 
Loan Assoc, of Denver v. National Homes Corp., 167 Colo. 93, 
445 P.2d 892 (1968); Teague v. Edwards, 159 Tx. 94, 315 
S.W.2d 950 (1958); Danby v. Osteopathic Hospital Association 
of Delaware, 34 DCh 172, 101 A.2d 308 (1953); Bryant v. 
Starkey, 8 Div. 439, 39 So.2d 291 (1949); Casserleigh v. 
Wood, 119 Fed. 308 (8th Cir., 1902). 
In Casserleigh v. Wood, supra, the appellant contracted 
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to give an estate in real property in return for factual 
evidence to establish a legal claim. This evidence was later 
determined to be immaterial to appellant's claim. In an 
effort to avoid the contract the appellant claimed that the 
same was unsupported by consideration. In rejecting this 
claim the court stated the general rule that "if the evidence 
was supposed material and necessary to establish the claim 
at the time of the promise, then the contract was founded on 
valuable consideration." (Emphasis added) If the promise 
was given for that which the promisor supposed he needed, the 
contract does not become voidable because of subsequent 
discovery that it is immaterial. Consideration is determined 
by conditions as they exist when the agreement is made and 
not by subsequent developments. Western Federal Savings & 
Loan Assoc, of Denver v. National Homes Corp., supra; Raine v. 
Spreckels, 77 Cal.App.2d 117, 174 P.2d 857 (1941); Teague v. 
Edwards, supra. 
This is also the law in Utah. In Allen v. Rose Park 
Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P.2d 823 (1951), this Court stated 
that "mutual promises that will be or apparently may be 
detrimental to the promisor or beneficial to the promisee and 
neither of which are void" constitute sufficient consideration. 
(Emphasis added) 
A defense of unjust enrichment was rejected by the Colorado 
court when a construction lender sought to enforce certain 
lien waivers executed by the defendant construction supplier 
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in Western Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, of Denver v. National 
Homes Corp., supra. The court reversed the trial court's 
decision that the lien waivers were unsupported by considera-
tion which resulted in unjust enrichment to the bank, stating: 
" . . . These items of consideration were not equal to 
the performance of National and it may be that National 
will receive nothing for its 12 packages. Nevertheless, 
legally there was consideration. A benefit to the 
promisor or a detriment to the promisee can constitute 
consideration, however slight . . . [and] is not to be 
measured in light of the eventual success or failure 
under a contract but rather consideration is measured 
as of the time of making the contract. . . . " 
"Since there is consideration, the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment cannot be used as a basis to nullify the 
[lien] waivers." 
There^ the consideration to support the lien waivers was 
a promise by the lender to extend credit to the contractor. 
It is also interesting to note that in the cases cited 
by Appellants, the courts found sufficient consideration 
supporting Respondents1 position. See Malcoff v. Coyier, 14 
Ariz. App. 524, 484 P.2d 1053 (1971); Teromen v. Kent-Brown 
Chevrolet Company, 217 Kan. 223, 535 P.2d 873 (1975); Kadish 
v. Kallof, 3 Ariz. App. 344, 414 P.2d 193 (1966); and Blonder 
v. Gentile, 149 Cal.App.2d 24, 309 P.2d 147 (1957). In Temmen, 
the Kansas court found sufficient consideration where the 
plaintiff suffered only the detriment of giving up the right 
to receive elsewhere a better bargain for auto repair work. 
The facts of the instant case clearly show that 
Respondents suffered a detriment, not slight but major; in 
fact, a personal liability for $1,050,000.00. Likewise, 
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Appellants gained several benefits. Even American Savings 
incurred a benefit as a result of Respondents1 promises and, 
of course, consideration may move to or from a third party. 
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §94. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Homes executed a note for 
$1,050,000.00, Appellants claim lack of consideration in that 
(1) the parties never intended that Homes become liable; (2) 
agreement 6-P is fatally ambiguous; and (3) Homes never 
actually became liable to American Savings. These contentions 
are clearly contrary to the evidence and the findings of the 
trial court. (R. 228; Findings 4-5) 
A. The parties expected and intended that Respondents 
would be personally liable on the note and mortgage. 
It is certainly a novel approach to say that experienced, 
sophisticated businessmen would arrange for and execute a one 
million dollar promissory note, never intending or expecting 
to be liable for the same. The testimony is clear that all 
the parties both intended and expected Homes to be personally 
liable. (Tr. 60, 63, 117, 248-250, 356-357, 371) Indeed, it 
is ridiculous to even suppose that in making such an unusually 
large loan American Savings would require Homes to cosign 
the note but never expect them to be liable. It was clearly 
understood that without the additional strength of Homes1 
credit, American Savings would not make the loan. (Exh. 11-P) 
The undisputed fact is that American Savings & Loan would not 
have approved the loan nor authorized the disbursal of the 
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funds thereafter if Homes had not signed the note and trust 
deed. (Tr. 119, 228-230, 248-250; Exhs. 7-P and 11-P) 
The initial loan commitment from American Savings was 
addressed to both Home and Gasser. (Tr. 57; Exh. 3-P) 
Gasser testified that he knew American Savings considered 
Home liable and, in fact, as early as March, 1973, discussed 
Home's liability with American Savings. (Tr. 62-64) In 
discussing with Home his participation in the loan, he 
further testified that Home stated " . . . that if he [Home] 
was going to enter into liabilities that he should receive 
compensation to compensate for this liability." (Tr. 60) At 
the time document 4-P was drafted, Gasser understood that in 
return for a one-half interest Home would be committed to the 
entire amount of the loan. (Tr. 116-117) 
Gasser spent April, May and June attempting to remove 
Homes1 liability but was unsuccessful. The American Savings 
commitment letter of June 6 stated that either the loan would 
have to be presold before closing or that Homes would have 
to sign. (Tr. 118-119, 248-249; Exh. 11-P) Certainly 
Appellants read and understood the various escrow documents 
and their deed to Home and must be presumed to have intended 
the natural result and consequence by signing them. (Exhs. 7, 
8, 9) 
Home testified that his purpose in signing the note and 
deed (Exh. 7-P) was to guarantee the loan with American 
Savings: 
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11Q. (By Mr, Nielsen) Now, what was the purpose of your 
signing the trust deed and note which appears a part of 
Exhibit 7-P? 
"A. To guarantee a loan with American Savings. (Tr. 
354) 
"Q. Are you prepared at this time to remain liable on 
those documents in reference to this transaction? 
"A. Yes." (Tr. 356) 
In an effort to support their claim regarding lack of 
consideration, Appellants point to the change of the word 
"removing" to "eliminating" on the face of Exhibit 4-P, 
paragraph 3. Such a specious attempt to distinguish the 
meaning of these terms is itself meaningless. It is merely 
an attempt to misconstrue the clear meaning of a document 
which is itself the best evidence of the intent of the parties 
and which this Court is able to read and evaluate as the trial 
court did. Both Websters International Dictionary and the 
Oxford English Dictionary define "eliminate" as "to remove" 
and "remove" as "to eliminate." Such attempted implications 
as alleged are at best tenuous. There is even a dispute as 
to when and how the change ever occurred. (Tr. 118) 
As further indication of the weakness of Appellants' 
position, there is no testimony that Appellants' attorney 
requested the change in Exhibit 5-P, paragraph 3. (Tr. 145, 
224, 307; Exhs. 5-P and 6-P) Appellants have miscited the 
record in an attempt to bolster their claims. Even so, 
Appellants' naked assertion that the changes made in paragraphs 
3 and 4 indicate that the parties did not intend liability 
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is entirely unsupported. If anything, these paragraphs make 
it crystal clear that the parties intended Homes should 
receive an interest if the 30-day condition was not met. 
This Court has held that where the parties to a transac-
tion dispute the intent surrounding some act involved in the 
transaction, the question of the intent is a factual issue 
and the determination of that factual issue will not be 
disturbed on appeal if there is any evidence to support it. 
Taylor v. Turner, 27 U.2d 39, 492 P.2d 1343 (1972); Youngren 
v. John W. Lloyd Construction Company, 22 U.2d 207, 450 P.2d 
985 (1969). 
B. Agreement 6-P states a valuable and sufficient 
consideration. 
Appellants claim that by the language of agreement 6-P 
Respondents did not agree to do anything. This assertion is 
not correct. When Exhibit 6-P was signed, Respondents had 
already performed. The note and trust deed were signed by 
Respondents on Thursday, June 28. (Tr. 304) These were 
delivered to the escrow holder on June 29 and became 
irrevocable when Appellants executed the escrow documents. 
(Tr. 308) Agreement 6-P was executed by Gassers on Friday, 
the 29th, with the other escrow documents, Exhibits 7, 8 and 
9. 
Agreement 6-P states the valuable consideration of both 
parties. The trial court properly found sufficient considera-
tion both in the* instrument and implied in the surrounding 
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circumstances. California Wine Assoc, v. Wisconsin Liquor 
Co., 20 Wise.2d 110, 121 N.W.2d 308 (1963); Vars v. Fisher, 
405 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. App., 1966) 
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §90, states: 
"It is the general rule that a consideration for a 
contract need not be recited or expressed in the writing 
since, if not expressed, consideration may be implied by 
or inferred from the terms and obvious import of the 
contract, or it may be proved by parole evidence." 
(Emphasis added) 
In In Re Las Colinas Inc., 294 F. Supp. 582 (D.P.R., 
196 8), an action by a debtor to rescind several notes and 
recover security given, the federal court stated the law to 
be: 
"Even though consideration is not expressed in a contract, 
it is presumed that it exists and that it is licit 
unless the debtor proves the contrary." (294 F.S. at 
p.597) 
The Tenth Circuit has also held that: 
". ... A contract includes all implied promises as are 
indispensable to effectuate the intent of the parties." 
New York Casualty Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 108 F.2d 
65 (10th Cir., 1939). 
Williston states that a promise which originally might 
have been too indefinite may become definite by performance. 
If a promise itself is insufficient but performance gives 
benefit or detriment, the promise becomes binding. Jaeger, 
Williston on Contracts, 3d ed., §106. 
Cases cited by Appellants do not support their position. 
In Malcoff v. Coyier, supra, the defendant orally agreed to 
pay plaintiff a commission for the sale of defendant's land. 
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Defendant later attempted to avoid the agreement by claiming 
lack of consideration. The court stated that: 
"We agree that it is essential that . . . there be a 
consideration or a mutuality of obligation; that its 
terms be sufficiently clear so that one can state with 
certainty the obligation involved. If the terms are 
ambiguous or uncertain, there is no contract unless by 
the performance of the parties it is shown and indicated 
that there was . . . a mutual understanding of agreement." 
(484 P.2d at p.1055) 
The court then outlined the performing acts of the plaintiff 
and enforced the contract. 
In the instant case the terms of the written contract 
are sufficiently clear and can be stated with certainty; that 
the parties had negotiated a loan with American Savings; that 
Respondents would provide the necessary financial backing for 
that loan and that Appellants would give a 50% interest in 
the property if Respondents were not removed from liability 
within 30 days. Furthermore, a "mutual understanding of 
agreement" was obviously reached when, in performance, 
Respondents executed the note and trust deed and Appellants 
executed the escrow documents. 
Also, in accord are the following cases cited by Appellants: 
Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Company, supra; and Blonder v. 
Gentile, supra. 
C. Respondents became and continue to be actually and 
personally liable to American Savings for $1,050,000.00. 
At the closing of the loan and for 30 days thereafter, 
the note and trust deed executed by Homes were held in escrow. 
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As previously noted, if at the end of 30 days (July 30, 1973) 
the loan remained unpurchased by Equitable Savings, then these 
documents would be immediately recorded and delivered to 
American Savings. (Tr. 249-250, 214-216; Exh. 7-P) By the 
terms of said note and trust deed, Respondents were personally 
liable. On July 3, 1973, Equitable Savings gave notice that 
it would not purchase the loan. (Tr. 250) During July, Gasser 
made no attempts to ask for an extension from Home or to 
obtain further help from American Savings. On July 30, 1973, 
the note and trust deed, not having been resold, were to be 
delivered to American Savings. Mr. Marsh, the escrow agent, 
testified that he was prepared to so proceed but was prevented 
from doing so by the filing of this lawsuit. (Tr. 214-216) 
But for the acts of Appellants, Respondentsf note would have 
been delivered to American Savings. However, the trial gave 
effect to the transaction as if the note had been delivered. 
Appellants claim that American Savings never considered 
Homes liable; and, therefore, to enforce the agreement will 
result in a "windfall" to Homes. Gasser1 s testimony and the 
testimony of Mr. Bradshaw undeniably indicate that American 
Savings would not have made the loan without Respondents being 
liable. (Tr. 116-117, 248-249) At trial, American Savings 
requested that Respondents be held liable with Appellants. 
(Tr. 372) By judgment of the trial court, Respondents are 
and continue to be liable to American Savings: 
"2. Defendants Home are jointly and severally liable 
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with Plaintiffs on that certain Promissory Note dated 
June 25, 1973, in the principal sum of $1,050,000.00 
payable to American Savings and Loan Association." 
(R. 236) 
Respondents have never repudiated or sought to avoid 
personal liability for the one million dollars plus. 
Appellants also argue that since Respondents have not 
made any personal payments, they have, in fact, not suffered 
any detriment. This is irrelevant since the note payments 
are being made from income produced by the trailer park in 
which Respondents own a 50% undivided interest. It might just 
as well be said that Appellants have not made any payments on 
the note either. It is relevant, however, to emphasize that 
under the terms of the loan transaction, Respondents are 
legally obligated personally to make payments on the indebted-
ness if for any reason payments are not otherwise made. 
Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Company, supra, cites 
Williston on Contracts, saying that detriment means "legal 
detriment as distinguished from detriment in fact." Williston 
defines "legal detriment" as: 
". . .A detriment to the promisee, in a legal sense, 
if he, at the request of the promisor and upon the 
strength of that promise, had performed any act which 
occasioned him the slightest trouble or inconvenience 
and which he was not obliged to perform." Jaeger, 
Williston on Contracts, 3d. ed., §102A. 
And in response to Appellants1 charge of "unjust enrich-
ment," Am. Jur. 2d provides: 
"Where on the part of the promisee, who was under no 
duty to do so, there has been an act . . . at the request 
of the promisor and upon the strength of that promise, 
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which act . . . occasioned the promisee disadvantage . . . 
though slight and not actually harmful, there is valid 
consideration, . . . " 
"If the promisee does something that he is not legally 
bound to do, the fact that he himself derives a benefit 
therefrom is not material." (Emphasis added) 17 Am. Jur. 
2d Contracts, §97. 
Agreement 6-P is binding and enforceable by the parties, 
being supported by valid and sufficient consideration. The 
consideration by Homes was given and performance completed. 
Respondents are willing and able to remain liable on the 
promissory note and trust deed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO FIND ECONOMIC 
DURESS OR COERCION. 
Appellants claim agreement 6-P is void, having been 
executed by them as a result of the duress and coercion of 
Homes and Mr. Henriod. The findings of the lower court are 
that: 
"12. The attorney representing the creditors of 
Plaintiffs . . . also represented Defendant Home on 
other matters but did not represent him in connection 
with the negotiations with Plaintiffs. 
"13. Plaintiffs were at all times during their negotia-
tions with Defendants Home represented by legal counsel 
and Plaintiffs counseled with their attorney. . . . 
"14. Plaintiffs executed said agreement . . . voluntarily 
and were not induced, coerced, intimidated or otherwise 
compelled to enter into such agreement by any improper 
conduct on the part of Defendants Home. 
"15. Defendants at no time were guilty of any wrongful 
or improper conduct. . . . " (R. 229-230, Findings of 
Fact 12-15) 
Appellants1 brief is replete with insinuations and 
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accusations of impropriety. We believe that to take up each 
item and refute it would be a waste of the Court's time. 
Respondents prefer merely to discuss the relevant issues. As 
before stated, Appellants ask this Court to substitute their 
"proposed" findings for the trial court's findings. The issue 
is not how this Court might find the facts based upon 
Appellants' choice of testimony, but whether the findings of 
the lower court are supported by the evidence. Pagano v. 
Walker, supra; Del Porto v. Nicolo, supra; Thomson v. Condas, 
supra. The evidence, as well as Respondents' authorities 
cited herein, amply support the above findings that Gassers 
were not wrongfully threatened or coerced into their agreement 
with Homes. 
Mr. Henriod, representing Dr. Skankey and "the group," 
sought to require Gassers to pay their delinquent obligations. 
(Tr. 113, 330) Gasser personally contacted Mr. Henriod and 
asked for his assistance in acquiring Dr. Skankey's interest 
in the property. (Tr. 113-114, 318; Exh. 15-D) It was Gasser 
who called Mr. Henriod for an appointment on March 29, 1973, 
and told Henriod that he had arranged financing through Homes. 
(Tr. 290) When Gasser brought Home into Mr. Henriod's office, 
Mr. Henriod did not participate in the negotiations but left 
them to work out their own arrangement. (Tr. 115, 291) Home 
never asked Mr. Henriod for his counsel or advice, and Mr. 
Henriod never offered it. (Tr. 113-115, 290, 301-302, 335, 
36 8) At all times Mr. Henriod acted as attorney for the 
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mortgagees and aided Gasser, only at the latter's request, in 
order to facilitate the eventual satisfaction of the debts 
owing to Henriod's clients. It was Gasser who dictated to 
Mr. Henriod the terms of agreement 4-P (Tr. 291); Gasser, 
after personally resolving his differences with Home on June 
27 and 28, called Mr. Henriod, instructing him how to rewrite 
document 5-P (Tr. 302); Exhibit 6-P was also a result of 
Gasser's initiative. (Tr. 145, 306, 326) During the entire 
transaction from April to July of 1973, Home never consulted 
nor requested advice from Mr. Henriod, never offered or agreed 
to pay for any legal services and never asked Henriod to 
prepare documents or otherwise represent him in any manner. 
(Tr. 365, 367-369) Mr. Henriod never suggested that Homes 
should receive compensation from Gasser for their liability 
on the obligation or even that they should lend their credit. 
In fact, it appears that Home had assisted Gasser on a 
financial matter or matters on a prior occasion. (Tr. 34-36) 
In order to perceive the weakness of Appellantsf argument 
of coercion from Homes and Mr. Henriod, this Court need only 
examine the quality of that argument. As an example of their 
alleged "squeeze play," Appellants point to a letter from Mr. 
Henriod to Mr. Barker, which letter was marked for identifica-
tion as 17-D. They single out an apparent typographical error 
as evidence that Mr. Henriod in fact represented Homes. 
However, that document was not even offered or received in 
evidence because of the objection to its introduction by 
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Appellants1 counsel. (Tr. 122, 153, R. 225; Exh. 17-D) 
It is undisputed that Mr. Henriod exerted considerable 
pressure on Appellants to pay their obligations. In June, 
1973, Gassers were over six months in default on their 
obligations of over $350,000.00. Mr. Henriod was retained to 
collect that amount and to foreclose the mortgages if necessary. 
Appellants claim that Mr. Henriod "threatened" American Savings 
& Loan. However, in the testimony recited by Appellants, Mr. 
Howard Bradshaw, President of American Savings, specifically 
stated that he was never "threatened." He testified only 
that the situation became too "uncomfortable" and "messy." 
(Tr. 241-242) Mr. Henriod testified that he did not discuss 
any problems between Gassers and Homes and that in conversa-
tions with American Savings only inquired when the loan 
proceeds would be available to Dr. Skankey and "the group." 
(Tr. 333-335) 
It is a general rule that to threaten to do that which 
a party has a legal right to do does not constitute duress or 
coercion. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 102 Ariz. 352, 429 P.2d 949 
(1967). Enforcement of a legal right by threats of fore-
closure is not duress. Kopp v. Fink, 204 Okla. 570, 232 P.2d 
161 (1951); Browning v. Blair, 169 Kan. 139, 218 P.2d 233 
(1950); Stafford v. Field, 70 Ida. 331, 218 P.2d 338 (1950); 
25 Am. Jur. 2d, Duress and Undue Influence, §7; Jaeger, 
Williston on Contracts (3d ed.), §§1606, 1608, 1618A. To 
ascribe to Mr. Henriod the attributes of a "card shark" 
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because he "held all the aces" is to suggest that every 
mortgagee with a right to foreclose a delinquent mortgage is 
a "river boat gambler." It was Mr. Henriod's right and duty 
to force satisfaction of the indebtedness to his clients by 
foreclosure if necessary. If any criticism is due, it is in 
his cooperation with the Gassers to give them additional time 
to arrange their refinancing. 
In Ensign v. Home for the Jewish Aged, 274 S.W.2d 502 
(Mo. App., 1955), the plaintiffs attempted to rescind an 
agreement to pay a certain sum for the care of their aged 
mother, alleging that the defendant knew and took advantage 
of her economic and physiological straits. Plaintiffs 
testified they signed the agreement unwillingly because there 
was nothing else to do. In rejecting their claims, the 
Missouri court stated: 
" . . . Duress cannot be sustained where there is full 
knowledge of the facts of the situation and ample time 
and opportunity for full and free investigation, 
deliberation and reflection. [citations omitted]." 
Gassers had every opportunity from April to June of 1973 
to make other financing arrangements without Homes. They 
were unsuccessful in dealing individually with American Savings; 
but the record does not show what other, if any, efforts were 
actually taken by them. Yet, as late as June 25, 1973, Gasser 
told Mr. Henriod that the loan would be closed without Homes' 
assistance. (Tr. 298-299) Mr. Henriod, representing Dr. 
Skankey and "the group," acted in reliance thereon. Gasser 
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corroborates this testimony. (Tr. 135-137; Exh. 18-D) Even 
during the crucial period of June 25 to June 29, Gassers had 
ample opportunity to consult and did consult with their 
counsel. They might have taken some alternative action. In 
fact, Mr. Henriodfs testimony indicates he fully expected 
such might be the case: 
11Q. And so at that time you knew that unless Mr. Home 
put his agreement, signature to that agreement that he 
was insisting on at that time that the money would go 
back again to American Savings and Loan and Mr. Gasser 
would lose everything he had, you knew that at that time, 
did you not? 
"A. You have asked me at least two questions. 
Responding to the first one, did I know that the money 
was there? The answer is yes, yes. 
"Did I know where the money would go if it didn't 
finalize? I didn't know where it would go. He might 
have had another deal, he is always saying he had 
alternative routes, he may have gone another way. 
"Third, I never made the statment that he would lose 
everything he had. 
"Q. Well, you were threatening to foreclose. 
"A. Yes, I was threatening to foreclose but that was 
only part of his assets." (Tr. 336-337) 
When asked about the alleged "threat" by Mr. Henriod in 
Home's office, Home testified as follows: 
"Q. Did you at any time on that date [June 28] hear Mr. 
Henroid [Henriod] state in substance and effect to Mr. 
and Mrs. Gasser unless they sign Exhibit 5-P that they 
would lose everything they had? 
. . . [Objection of counsel overruled] 
"The witness: No, I did not." (Tr. 355) 
As authorities for their argument, Appellants cite 
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Dittbrenner v. Myerson, 114 Colo. 448, 167 P.2d 15 (1946); 
and Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., Inc., 86 N.M. 405, 524 
P.2d 1021 (1974). These cases support the trial court's 
findings. In Dittbrenner, the court found the plaintiff was 
coerced when she was forced to sign a conveyance and agreement. 
Yet the court did so after testimony that the plaintiff was 
in fear of "injury to her person" and the destruction of her 
property. Also, the court found constructive fraud in the 
inducements made to the plaintiff. In the instant case, 
there is no evidence that Gassers were ever in fear of 
physical injury to themselves or destruction of their property. 
(Tr. 187) The Colorado court also characterized the plaintiff. 
as a weak woman with a lack of business judgment. This case 
has since been cited as applicable to weak and incompetent 
persons. Certainly Appellants cannot be so characterized. 
Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., Inc., supra, merely 
supports Respondents' argument that the trial court's findings 
are affinned when supported by the evidence. In Terrel, the 
New Mexico court, affirming the findings of economic duress 
by the trial court, stated: 
"The charge of economic compulsion, like fraud, is one 
easily made. . . . It must therefore be proven by clear 
and convincing evidence. . . . 
. . • 
"'It is a well settled rule that this court, on appeal, 
will . . . view the evidence in an aspect most favorable 
to the judgment and the party prevailing below. . . . 
[T]he weight of the evidence is not considered on appeal, 
rather only, if there is any substantial evidence to 
support the verdict. . . .' 
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. . . [citations omitted] 
"The above cases conform with the ordinary rules of 
review of the record on appeal. That is, presumptions 
are in favor of verdicts and reviewing courts will view 
the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing 
party, will indulge in all reasonable inferences in 
support of the verdict, and will disregard all inferences 
or evidence to the contrary. Further, it is for the 
jury and not the reviewing court to weigh the testimony, 
determine the credibility of witnesses, reconcile 
inconsistent or contradictory statements of witnesses 
and say where the truth lies. . . . [citations omitted] 
We will review the evidence to determine if it is 
sufficient to establish, clearly and convincingly, the 
claim of economic compulsion." 
Upon examination of the trial court's findings in Terrel, 
the appellate court detailed numerous incidents over several 
years which established a pattern of consistent conduct by 
the defendant to ruin the plaintiff financially so as to 
acquire his lumber business. The defendant creditor continually 
"meddled" in the plaintiff's business until the plaintiff was 
deprived of all economic decisions. 
Appellants Gasser did not meet their burden of proof in 
the trial below. The evidence clearly preponderates against 
their claims. Even under the "Terrel test" which Appellants 
ask this Court to apply, Respondents did not act in a 
"commercially unreasonable manner" by asking for a 50% interest 
in exchange for a 100% liability. Neither was Mr. Henriod 
unreasonable in pressuring for the payment to his clients of 
$350,000.00 in already delinquent notes. 
This Court is well aware of its prior decisions regarding 
duress and coercion. Reliable Furniture Co. v. American Home 
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Assurance Co., 24 U.2d 93, 466 P.2d 368 (1970); Reliable 
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters 
Inc., 16 U.2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965); Fox v. Piercey, 119 
Utah 367, 227 P.2d 763 (1951); and Ellison v. Pingree, 64 
Utah 468, 231 Pac. 827 (1924). 
In Fox, this Court applied the modern subjective standard 
which asks the question: 
"Did the threats or coercive acts put one entering into 
the transaction in such fear as to preclude the exercise 
by him of free will and judgment? Age, sex, capacity, 
relation of the parties, attendant circumstances must 
all be considered. Persons of a weak or cowardly nature 
are the very ones that need protection. The courageous 
can usually take care of themselves." 227 P.2d at 766. 
Appellants' argument confuses the old objective standard with 
the modern subjective standard articulated by this Court. 
Probing a person's actual state of mind is purely subjective 
and at best can only be analyzed by reference to objective and 
visible signs such as are noted above. Chief Justice Wolfe, 
concurring, alerted the Court to the inevitable dangers of a 
subjective approach: 
"I see merit in the so-called modern rule that any threat 
which actually puts the victim in such fear as to compel 
him to act against his will constitutes duress but it has 
reaches which ramify into the realm of psychology and, in 
its practical application, may encounter difficulties of 
discernment between the sly and the timid. The brash and 
robust mind may easily later on take a sensitive hue. 
'The devil a monk would be' if it might aid recovery." 
227 P.2d at 768. 
This is precisely the approach now taken by Appellants. 
In order to resolve financial problems of their own making, 
Gassers arranged their agreement with Homes so that Gassers 
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could purchase the entire mobile park and take home $94,000.00 
in cash. Gassers, now pointing to their new sensitive natures, 
claim rescission when the transaction did not work out as 
anticipated by them. 
However, the Court in Fox, realizing this danger of the 
modern, subjective form of analysis which they adopted, 
provided a caveat: 
"We approve this modern rule. It is obvious that 
applying this subjective test might theoretically 
degenerate to a point where a person desiring to avoid 
a contract might claim that practically any conduct of 
another put him in fear and overcame his will. It is 
necessary that there be some objective standard for 
determining when duress has been practiced. It must 
appear that the threat or act is of such a nature and 
made under such circumstances as to constitute a reason-
able and adequate cause to control the will of the 
threatened person, Ellison v. Pingree, supra. 17 Am. 
Jur. 8857 note 15 and authorities there cited. 
"Notwithstanding the fact that we approve this modern 
and liberal rule as a test of whether or not duress has 
been practiced, under all the authorities, ancient and 
modern, the act or threat constituting duress must be 
wrongful." [Emphasis added] 227 P.2d at 766. 
In essence, this Court designed a three-prong test: the acts 
complained of must constitute reasonable and adequate cause 
to control the will of the complainant; the acts must actually 
put the complaining victim in such fear as to compel actions 
against his will; and the acts must be wrongful. 
In Ellison v. Pingree, supra, this Court was asked to 
review facts similar to the instant case. Pingree1s company, 
the Ogden Packing and Provisions Company, incurred heavy 
financial losses and was unable to pay Chicago creditors. 
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Security was demanded by these creditors and they threatened 
Pingree with civil and criminal actions for fraud and actions 
against the company for its indebtedness. In March, after a 
week of negotiations, Pingree agreed to deliver personally 
secured notes for the indebtedness. However, a few months 
later Pingree suggested modifications of the agreement which 
were opposed by the creditors. Threats of criminal prosecution 
were reiterated. In June, Pingree signed an agreement to 
secure obligations of $250,000.00. At all times Pingree was 
represented by and consulted with his attorney. His counsel 
advised him not to sign the agreement; but when told by Pingree 
that he must, the attorney tried to get for him the best deal 
possible by suggesting modifications in the terms of the 
contracts. Later, Pingree sued to rescind the agreement, 
claiming that the same was without consideration and was obtained 
by duress. 
The court analyzed the age, financial condition of the 
plaintiff, the relative positions of the parties and other 
surrounding circumstances of the transaction. Since the 
plaintiff was a wealthy businessman of varied experience and 
during all the negotiations had the benefit of legal counsel, 
the court indicated there was no duress involved. Furthermore, 
the court stated that Pingree, in a large measure, had 
dictated the terms of the agreements and was largely benefited 
by being released from a prior contract. Regarding duress, 
the court stated: 
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"•. . . duress will not ordinarily invalidate a contract 
entered into after opportunity for deliberate action. 
Duress by mere advice, direction, influence, and persua-
sion is not recognized in law. Nor can a charge of legal 
duress be based on mere vexation and annoyance, mere 
pecuniary distress, a threat to injure one's credit, or 
the refusal to surrender property on which one has a 
lien.' 
111A person in his right mind and in full control of his 
faculties, who understands what he is doing and who has 
full power to enter into a legal transaction or to refuse 
to do so, does not act under duress if he enters into 
such transaction.1" 64 Utah at 476-477. 
There is no duress when Appellants are free to come and 
go and to consult with counsel. Ellison v. Pingree, supra; 
Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885 (3d 
Cir., 1975); Palatucci v. Woodland, 166 Pa. Super. 315, 70 
A.2d 674 (1950), and cases cited therein. 
Again, in Ellison, the court commented on the allegation 
of lack of consideration in urging the claim of duress: 
"It would be a needless task to undertake to point out 
why the contention is untenable. The mere fact that Mr. 
Pingree not only had a pecuniary interest, but a very 
large pecuniary interest in maintaining the credit and 
integrity of the company, was one sufficient considera-
tion for the contracts." 64 Utah at 478. 
In Reliable Furniture v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance 
Underwriters, Inc., supra, this Court, applying the law of 
Fox and Ellison, reversed the trial court's summary judgment 
and remanded the case for a decision on the evidence. This 
Court stated the general rule that the fact one is in financial 
need inducing him to accept a settlement will not, of itself, 
provide a basis for relief. 398 P.2d at 687. However, as 
35 
quoted by Appellants, since the plaintiff also claimed fraud 
by the insurance company, the court could not find, as a 
matter of law, that there was no duress. At trial, the lower 
court dismissed plaintiff's case after hearing the evidence. 
This Court affirmed, stating that there was insufficient 
evidence of fraud or duress. Reliable Furniture v. American 
Home Assurance Co., supra. The plaintiff could not claim 
fraud and duress after he had cashed the insurance checks and 
accepted the benefits of the agreement. There exists the 
same situation in the instant case. Not only did Gassers 
accept the benefit of the agreement, but they also ended up 
with a cash payment to them of $94,000.00 from the proceeds 
of the loan. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANTS A JURY 
TRIAL. 
Appellants1 argument that they were entitled to a jury 
trial is equally without merit. For purposes of seeking this 
Court's review of the trial court's findings, Appellants 
suggest this case is an action in equity. But when they come 
to discuss the alleged deprivation of their "rights" to a 
jury trial, Appellants would have us treat this case as an 
action at law. 
The case was originally set for non-jury trial on October 
11, 1974. How the case was set on the jury calendar 
Respondents and the lower court were unable to determine. 
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Contrary to the suggestion of Appellants, both parties did not 
"expect a jury trial." Certainly Respondents entertained no 
such expectation and when it was learned that Appellants had 
apparently requested a jury (without any notice to Respondents) 
moved to strike the case from the jury calendar. (R. 214-215) 
Respondents' motion to strike was granted. (R. 218, 220) 
(1) Appellants1 brief states the nature of the 
case to be an action to declare a contract and agreement null 
and void; that the suit was brought to rescind that agreement 
and to cancel a deed in escrow. (R. 1-2) An action to cancel 
an instrument or rescind a contract for fraud or duress is an 
equitable action and does not entitle a party to trial by 
jury. Johnson v. Johnson, 9 U.2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959); 
Summers v. Martin, 77 Ida. 469, 295 P.2d 265 (1956); Goodson 
v. Smith, 69 Wyo. 439, 243 P.2d 163 (1952), reh. den. 244 P.2d 
805; Liles v. Bigpond, 190 Okla. 112, 121 P.2d 596 (1942), and 
numerous authorities cited by these courts. In Goodson, a 
deed was already placed in escrow and the defendants counter-
claimed for specific performance. In Bigpond, the Oklahoma 
court interpreted a statute very similar to §78-21-1, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), and held it inapplicable to an action 
for rescission or cancellation of an agreement to convey. 
This is not an action to recover the possession of real 
property within the purview of §78-21-1, U.C.A. (1953). The 
decisions of this Court are certainly dispositive of the issue. 
In Johnson, this Court held that a suit to declare certain 
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instruments void for reason of duress or undue influence was 
properly characterized by the trial court as an action in 
equity and, therefore, no jury trial. A review of Appellants1 
complaint shows that the issues raised are wholly and purely 
equitable in nature. And, only recently, this Court stated 
that when the principal thrust of a case is equitable, to-wit: 
specific performance (Respondents1 requested relief), the 
lower court properly denied a trial by jury. Bradshaw v. 
Kershaw, 529 P.2d 803 (Utah, 1974). 
At the time of trial Appellants did not make any demand 
to the court that the case be tried to a jury. Rather, 
Appellants• counsel sought to characterize the action as one 
for injunctive relief (R. 1-2); "to retain the status quo" 
(T. 97)—further indication that the issues presented are 
equitable. See^  also, Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 U.2d 
113, 417 P.2d 126 (1966). 
(2) Appellants failed to make proper demand for a 
jury trial under the requirements of Rule 38 (b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and the then local rule, Rule 15, Rules 
of Practice in the Third Judicial District Court, Both rules 
require written demand and Rule 38(b) requires that the 
written demand be served on the opposing party. As admitted 
by Appellants, the record reveals that no written demand was 
filed nor ever served on Respondents. Yet the failing party 
begs excuse, crying that since Respondents later learned of 
a "jury demand," no harm was done. After all, Appellants 
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claim, following the requirements of the rules is not 
important. This Court has previously been acquainted with the 
failure of these Appellants to follow the requirements of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and then later beg this Court1s 
indulgence. Rule 38(b) states that demand must be served on 
Respondents in writing. Substantial performance cannot be 
accomplished by merely paying the requisite jury fee and 
hoping the opposing party learns about it sometime in the 
future. 
The trial court has discretion to permit or deny trial 
by jury, particularly when demand was improper. The denial 
of a jury trial when demand is improper is not an abuse of 
discretion. Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., supra; James 
Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 15 U.2d 210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964), 
and cases cited therein. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when, after hearing arguments of counsel and 
considering the authoritative cases from this Court, it 
granted Respondents1 motion to strike from the jury calendar. 
(R. 218) 
In asking this Court to remand this case for a jury trial, 
Appellants are raising an issue not raised at trial or after 
trial. The Supreme Court cannot look dehors the record on 
appeal and consider facts which are stated in a brief but are 
absent from the record. Cooper v. Foersters Underwriters Inc., 
123 Utah 215, 257 P.2d 540 (1953). It is the responsibility 
of Appellants to see that all matters essential to a decision 
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of a question be properly included in the record on appeal. 
All the record in this matter shows is the absence of a proper 
demand for jury trial and Respondents1 motion and the court's 
order striking the matter from the jury calendar. Appellants 
were therefore not entitled to a jury trial and may not raise 
this issue on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings and judgment of the lower court are 
substantially supported by the evidence and should be affirmed. 
Respondents have been and continue to be liable to American 
Savings & Loan and are entitled to an undivided 50% interest 
in the Hill Gate Mobile Home Park. Appellants voluntarily 
entered into a valid agreement with Respondents, supported by 
sufficient and valuable consideration, and were not induced 
by duress, coercion or any other improper or wrongful conduct. 
The trial court properly denied Appellants a jury trial 
since Appellants were not entitled thereto and totally failed 
to comply with the provisions of Rule 38(b) in attempting to 
secure one. 
Respondents Home respectfully submit that the judgment 
and decree of the trial court be affirmed. 
Arthur H. Nielsen v 
Joseph L. Henriod 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD,.GOTTFREDSON & 
PECK 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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